



In connection with the regulation of local gov-
ernments’ indebtedness, the literature on pub-
lic finances (Ter – Minassian – Craig, 1997) dis-
tinguishes four basic models: market regulated
model, centrally controlled model, rule based
model and cooperative model. Regulation in
other fields of economy (e.g. in the banking
market regarding risks or in issues related to
accounting rules of enterprises etc.) is charac-
terised by the creation of international stan-
dards. These standards, in turn, are implement-
ed by countries within their own legal systems.
The legal regulations that determine the opera-
tion of the system of local governments evolve
in line with the features of the given municipal-
ity system in each country. The regulations
have a local nature. These features are deter-
mined by the evolution of the municipality sys-
tem of the given country and the circumstances
of this evolution. 
Researches in Hungary that empirically exam-
ined the indebtedness models of local govern-
ments found that of the four general models
drafted by Ter – Minassian – Craig, the
Hungarian practice follows the characteristics of
the “market regulated model”. (Homolya –
Szigel, 2008; Vigvári, 2009). However, studying
the models may also lead to other conclusions.
Doesn’t the law that regulates the rules of oper-
ation of local governments (Act on Local
Governments) or the Act on the Debt
Settlement of Local Governments, which is con-
sidered to be a “Hungaricum”, justify an expla-
nation of the domestic regulation of the indebt-
edness of local governments with the rule based
approach? Or do the main characteristic features
explored during the examination of the local
government lending market of Hungary warrant
the drafting of a new model? This study search-
es for answers to these questions through an
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analysis of the most important circumstances in
the local government lending market.1
THE REGULATION OF INDEBTEDNESS IN
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT LENDING
MARKET
Several studies deal with the operation and def-
inition of markets,2 but, given the nature of the
subject, defining the concept of market is no
easy task. Within market – as a comprehensive
concept – financial markets mean special mar-
kets. From the aspect of modelling their oper-
ational mechanisms, the theoretical model of
perfect market can be considered as an impor-
tant milestone. (Brealey – Myers, 1998)
An important phase in the development of
the theories related to financial markets (and in
the train of thoughts of this study) is the model
of efficient markets (Fama, 1970), which has
served as background and framework for
empirical studies since the birth of the theoret-
ical model. The theory of efficient markets has
been exposed to attacks and empirical denials
since the mid-1980s. It has been proven that
capital markets do not always meet the criteria
of information efficiency. (Komáromi, 2002)
Disorders experienced in the flow of infor-
mation, i.e. information asymmetries, may be
the main obstacles to both market perfection
and market efficiency. In financial markets,
debt is a relationship that reflects a special
information asymmetry, where the debtor on
the demand side always has more information
on his own ability and intention to repay the
loan than the creditor on the supply side.
(Diamond, 1984; Király, 1995)
This study examines the interrelationship of
commercial banks as financial intermediaries
and local governments as savers and investors at
the same time, in the money and capital markets,
which do not work perfectly and efficiently. In
terms of the instruments examined, it primari-
ly discusses the questions of credit and bond
based financing in detail. The choice between
the two instruments is determined by the char-
acteristics of credit and bond that can be cap-
tured through the given market segment.
Overall, it is determined by market rationality.
This market is consistently called local govern-
ment lending market in this study below.
The literature on public finances (Ter –
Minassian – Craig, 1997) that deals with the
regulation of local governments’ indebtedness
distinguishes four basic models. The first one is
the market regulated model, in which there is no
state guarantee for the debt of local govern-
ments, market participants are perfectly
informed, local governments behave in a fiscal-
ly sensible manner, and the market players that
finance them do not have any competitive
advantage. The essence of the market regulated
model is that for the players of the subnational
level, borrowing is determined by money and
capital market developments and mechanisms.
The less guarantee is undertaken by the central
government for the repayment of loans to local
governments, i.e. the more obvious the lack of
implicit government guarantee is for the mar-
ket participants, the stronger this control is.
(Barati, 2002)
The second model is the centrally controlled
model, where the regulation is focused on per-
mitting the borrowing. The internationally
known regulations differ from one another in
the extent to which the central budget stands
behind the local government in case of default,
and in whether there is any limit to the indebt-
edness of local governments. Namely, these
limitations are practically able to minimise the
risk of the creditors of the sector.
Based on all the above, there are two funda-
mental techniques of the central limitation of
borrowing by local governments: active  and
passive control. In the case of active control,
borrowing requires the central government’s
approval or the approval of the community STUDIES 
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concerned through local referendum. In the
case of passive control, some kind of bench-
mark, a maximum amount of loan may be
determined (for example, as a percentage of a
budget indicator), or borrowing may be limited
exclusively to investment purposes.
State guarantee is not automatic for local
governments with independent budget,
although setting up special guarantee funds sup-
ported by the government (European solution)
or the operation of credit insurance institutions
on a business basis are frequent solutions.
Systems that work in practice as well feed on
both solutions.3 (Kopányi – Vigvári, 2003a)
In addition to the aforementioned two mod-
els, the rule based approach and the cooperative
model  are also known in the regulation of
indebtedness. In the countries where indebted-
ness is regulated according to the rule based
model, excessive borrowing is limited by rules
set out by law. In the case of local governments
operating on the basis of the cooperative model,
the leaders of local bodies decide on the extent
of indebtedness in agreement with the central
government (in a cooperative manner).
THE HUNGARIAN CASE IN THEORY
Based on studying the theoretical correlations
of the four models, we can easily conclude that
the regulation of indebtedness of local govern-
ments in Hungary follows the rule based
approach. This may be supported by the fact
that the local governments’ borrowing limit
was included in the Act on Local Governments
when it was amended in 1995 (Section 88).
Accordingly, local governments’ annual com-
mitments originating from debt may not
exceed 70 per cent of the value of own revenues
reduced by short-term liabilities. 
In addition, the Act on the Debt Settlement
of Local Governments, which is considered to
be a “Hungaricum”, also intends to regulate
excessive indebtedness and the situation when
local governments become unable to function.
The Act defines the mandatory tasks that local
governments have to perform even in the
course of debt settlement, and regulates how
the continuity of local public services have to
be ensured following the reform of the finan-
cial management of local governments. It also
stipulates the conditions of launching the pro-
cedure (undisputed debt overdue for more than
60 or 90 days). (Herbst – Szegvári, 1996; Jókay
– Osváth – Sóvágó – Szmetana, 2004; Jókay –
Veres-Bocskay, 2009) This Act also stipulates
that the central government does not support
the local governments with its guarantee.
Furthermore, it summarises the rules of debt
settlement between the debtor local govern-
ment and the creditor. 
In contrast, however, the researches by
Homolya – Szigel (2008) and Vigvári (2009)
came to the conclusion that while there is no
legal sanction of the non-compliance with
Section 88 of the Act on Local Governments
and with the rules set out in the Act on the
Debt Settlement of Local Governments, the
practice in Hungary operates more according
to the market regulated model. Namely, the
risks inherent in the local government system
all call attention to the fact that the observance
and enforceability of the borrowing limit set
forth by law is not ensured even in the short
run. The underlying reason is that the leaders
of local governments are not responsible for
the medium- or long-term observance of the
limitation stipulated by law, and thus they tend
to run into debt in the present on account of
the future. 
The theoretical fundamental conditions of
the market regulated model assumed by empir-
ical researches are as follows. 
XThe same regulations apply to local gov-
ernments and other market participants, i.e.
local governments do not enjoy any privileges
during the lending procedure. STUDIES 
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YAll participants of the lending process
have the same information, i.e. all the necessary
data and information can be obtained about the
local governments as borrowers.
ZMarket participants, including local gov-
ernments, behave in an economically rational
manner.
[There is no explicit or implicit govern-
ment guarantee behind local governments’ bor-
rowing. (Ter – Minassian – Craig, 1997)
Further on, through a brief analysis of the
demand and supply sides of the local govern-
ment lending market, this study attempts to
present which of the models is relevant.
THE HUNGARIAN CASE IN PRACTICE 
Supply-side features
Since 2004, it has been mandatory for local
governments to select their account-holding
bank through a public procurement proce-
dure.4 Today, the budgetary suspense account is
still allowed to be kept by only one bank,
although banks may compete for this status.
Examining the market competition for keep-
ing local governments’ accounts (see Table 1),
OTP Bank, which can be considered the mar-
ket leader with its share of 68 per cent, repre-
sents the highest weight. In parallel with the
market dominance of OTP , a steady increase in
the market share of Takarékszövetkezeti
Integráció  (Integration of Savings Co-opera-
tives) is observed; they took second place in
the local government lending market in 2008.
In terms of the increase in lending dynamics,
Raiffeisen Bank should be mentioned. The
bank in question was able to increase its market
share in a steady and aggressive manner in the
period under review. In addition to the afore-
mentioned three market players, Erste Bank,
K&H Bank, CIB Bank and Commerzbank
were able to secure a higher market share.
The fight for clients is extremely fierce. This
is justified by the fact that the number of big-
Table 1 
CREDIT INSTITUTIONS THAT KEEP LOCAL GOVERNMENTS' ACCOUNTS
Credit institution June 2006 September 2006 June 2007 March 2008 June 2010
ea % ea % ea % ea % ea %
OTP   Bank 2   325 72.8    2   313 72.4    2   255 70.6    2   178 68.2    2   005 65.4   
Takarékszövetkezeti   Integráció   
+   outside   of   integration 618 19.3    629 19.8    667 20.9    707 22.1    750 24.5   
Raiffeisen   Bank 105 3.3    105 3.3    110 3.4    130 4.1    160 5.2   
Erste  Bank 65 2.0 65 2.0 65 2.0 64 2.0 72 2.4 
K&H  Bank 44 1.4 45 1.4 48 1.5 57 1.8 78 2.5 
CIB  Bank 13 0.4 13 0.4 15 0.5 15 0.5  n.a. –
Commerzbank 11 0.3 11 0.3 11 0.3 11 0.3  n.a. –
Takarékbank 5 0.2 5 0.2 5 0.2 5 0.2 6 0.2 
UniCredit  Bank 4 0.1 4 0.1 4 0.1 4 0.1  n.a. –
Magyarországi  Volksbank 4 0.1  4 0.1 14 0.4 21 0.7  n.a. –
Budapest  Bank 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.001  n.a. –
MKB  Bank 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.001  n.a. –
Total 3   194 100.0    3   194 100.0    3   194 100.0    3   194 100.0    3   066* 100.0   
* Based on data available for 2010
Source: own collection [based on Napi-online, Világgazdaság (2010 data) and the data of the Hungarian State Treasury] STUDIES 
129
city and county local governments, which man-
age an annual budget of at least one billion
forints, amounts to around three hundred. It is
similar in size to the clientele constituted by
large companies in the field of corporate
finance. This feature generates sharp market
competition among the banks that are active in
the local government lending market. (Bank &
Tõzsde, 2007) 
Accordingly,  strong concentration can be
observed on the supply side of the market. In
terms of account management, three banks
control approximately 95 per cent of the
total local government market, while a slow
expansion of newly entering players is wit-
nessed. Of the latter, the performance of
Magyarországi Volksbank, which quintupled
its market share in the period under review, is
outstanding. Two new participants, MKB
Bank and Budapest Bank, joined the supply
side in 2008.
In this segment, bank exposure as a percent-
age of the regulatory capital of the banking sec-
tor  increased  by 18.1 percentage points
between 31 December 2006 and 31 October
2010 (see Chart 1). Based on the data available,
the regulatory capital of the banking sector
shows a coverage between 32–42 per cent
between 2008 and 2010 regarding the financing
of the local government sector. The primary
reason for the dynamic growth experienced in
2010 was not the large-scale issue of new loans
or bonds, but the increase in exposure resulting
from the exchange rate change of instruments
denominated in foreign currency. 
The dynamic growth indicates that banks
have deemed lending to the local government
sector perspective and safe. One of the under-
lying reasons is that local governments cannot
be dissolved without succession in a classical
sense. Local governments that face payment
problems may initiate the launching of a debt
Chart 1 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPOSURE AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE REGULATORY CAPITAL 
OF THE BANKING SECTOR
Source: own editing based on MNB data STUDIES 
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settlement procedure against themselves. Not
only local governments may exercise this right,
but any creditor or supplier can initiate the
launching of the debt settlement procedure.
Although it is set out in the Act on the Debt
Settlement of Local Governments that the
state does not discharge the obligations under-
taken by the local government, banks still
believe that their funds placed out in this sector
will not disappear. 
As a result of the turbulent effects of the
financial crisis, a decline in banks’ willingness
to lend was observed in all segments in 2009.
Restructuring took place on the asset side of
banks’ balance sheets, which was motivated by
the restoration of liquidity as well as by the
cleaning of the loan portfolio. Of the house-
hold, corporate and local government sectors,
the banking sector clearly considered lending
to the local government sector the safest. 
The Features of Supply Instruments
Based on the experience of the 2000s collected
to date, borrowing  and  issuing bonds are the
two most typical techniques to raise foreign
funds in the local government sector.5 Lending
activity may significantly be influenced by
those statutory provisions that must consis-
tently be observed by both market partici-
pants. The product range of banks is deter-
mined not only by statutory provisions, but
also by the “loopholes” (Jókay, 2007) that are
suitable for ensuring the financing of local
governments in line with the text of the law.
Of the available product range, liquidity loan,
which is not included in the borrowing limit
and which creditors typically resort to, has to
be mentioned. However, SAO audits found
that many local governments used liquidity
loans in an irregular manner.
The inclusion of the bill of exchange in local
government financing has been a recent deve-
lopment. Stemming from the credit instrument
and financing facility function of the bill of
exchange (Gál, 2009), this financial instrument
is also a classical form of raising external funds.
The bill of exchange – as a credit instrument –
may primarily be an alternative of liquidity
loans. However, in addition to lending, stem-
ming from its negotiability, it is also able to
function as a means of payment. In spite of its
advantages, this product has not yet become a
generally applied financial instrument in this
sector. In addition to the aforementioned prod-
uct, the institution of factoring  has spread
increasingly. Another classical product is the
long-term investment loan. However, it has
steadily been ousted by long-term bond issues
since 2006. (See Chart 2) 
Bond issues, which increased in the second
half of 2006, had a dual objective: a part of
them made earlier-extended long-term loans
convertible, while with another part of them a
considerable amount of additional funds was
received in the local government system. While
10-year loans had been typical in the long-term
financing of local governments, the use of
bonds resulted in an extension of maturity to
20–25 years. (Homolya – Szigel, 2008)
This wave of bond issues came to a sudden
halt in 2009 (Chart 2), i.e. the trend stopped.
Nevertheless, according to the stock data accu-
mulated in the financial system, the bond can
still be considered as a popular and significant
financial instrument. Based on MNB’s data, the
nominal value of bonds issued until the end of
September 2010 amounted to 522 billion
forints.6 As for ratio, this financial instrument
amounts to 55.8 per cent of the total external
sources (loans and bonds together).
In addition to the spreading of financing
through bonds, the data in Chart 2 also call
the attention to the dynamic increase in
external funds denominated in foreign cur-
rency. In terms of denomination, the share of
foreign exchange financing (bonds and loans STUDIES 
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Chart 2 
THE COMPOSITION OF EXTERNAL FUNDS INVOLVED IN THE FINANCING OF THE LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT SECTOR, 2001-2010KÜLSÕ FORRÁSOK ÖSSZETÉTELE, 2001–2010
Source: own editing based on MNB data
Chart 3 
FOREIGN EXCHANGE-BASED FINANCING
Source: own editing based on MNB data
Foreign exchange proportion
Forint loans (HUF billion)
Foreign exchange loans (HUF billion)
Forint-denominated bonds (HUF billion)
Foreign exchange-denominated bonds (HUF billion)























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































together) within external borrowing amounted
to 65 per cent at the end of September 2010.
(See Chart 3)
An important issue from the aspect of cred-
it institutions’ liquidity is the provision for
sources of foreign exchange for the foreign
exchange-denominated liability side products.
This is an important issue in terms of both
asset and liability side liquidity, particularly
when the banking sector’s loan/deposit ratio is
fluctuating around 145 per cent. (Fischer –
Homolya, 2009)
Viewing the local government sector as a
whole, based on MNB’s aggregate data of 30
November 2009, the ratio of long-term financ-
ing (Chart 2) is 89.7 per cent, representing a
12.1 percentage point increase compared with
the corresponding figures of 2001. This picture
is further nuanced by the fact that a certain
portion of long-term debt finances operating
costs and improves liquidity.
The shift in the maturity structure of financ-
ing apparently means fleeing forward on the
part of local governments. However, in terms
of the building up of risks, it should be empha-
sised that the debt servicing and interest bur-
dens of today’s borrowings will have to be
managed by future local government budgets.
Taking account of all the above, we can call this
policy irresponsible behaviour, which takes
place in a macroeconomic situation when the
sources of loan repayments are scanty and
show a declining trend.
Market Rationality and Moral Hazard
The lending decisions of commercial banks
that finance local governments are driven by
several factors jointly. Of course, the decisions
on lending and bond issues (of which they are
subscribers to) are preceded by a debtor rating
procedure, although the decisions on actual
lending are not primarily driven by the findings
of the credit risk propositions. This is partly
explained by the information asymmetries that
limit transparency in connection with the
financial management of the given local gov-
ernment. (Gál, 2010a) These ex ante informa-
tion asymmetries are induced by the informa-
tion and control system of public accounting.
Another important aspect is account relation-
ship capital, which represents a serious compet-
itive advantage for the account-holding credit
institution during an issuance. 
Due to the reasons described above, lending
banks continue to deem their placements to
this sector low-risk ones. The dynamic increase
in the lending to the local government sector
was also motivated by the shortage of funds
resulting from the financial crisis; with their
depositing activity, local governments are
excellent partners. In addition, the “matter of
prestige” and strategic aspects also play impor-
tant roles, which is a result of the strong supply
side competition.
The above listed factors together lead to a
building up of risks in the local government
lending portfolios. A way of reducing these
risks may be the adequate supporting of lending
from the collateral side. The developments
since 2000 until nowadays reflect that instead of
a decline in risks a build-up of risks is witnessed
on the collateral side as well. (See Chart 4)
The survey prepared on the basis of the
autumn 2000 data recording of TÁRKI (Chart
4) reported that the collateral of loans was
mostly real estate and, to a smaller extent, tax
proceeds and revenues from fees. (Barati, 2000)
However, MNB’s survey based on June 2008
data reported that the coverage of loans by real
securities in the surveyed banks’ local govern-
ment portfolio amounted to around a mere 17
per cent.7 The presence of real estate collateral
in the security structure is 6–7 per cent.
The changes took place in parallel with the
above described increase in exposure, which
entailed the spread of new schemes along with STUDIES 
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the loans. All this means that from 2000 to 2007
the banking sector’s exposure to local govern-
ments became around 12.6 times higher, while
the value of exposure not covered by real securi-
ty increased from 25 per cent to 83 per cent with-
in the total exposure. 
The trend reflects the lobbying force of local
governments well, and indicates the practice of
commercial banks during which they do not
primarily approach lending decisions from the
collateral or asset sides. These decisions are
much more motivated by the willingness and
ability to take risks as well as regulatory issues
of the operation of local governments. All this
represents serious moral hazard with respect to
both the creditor and the borrower.
In the case of real estates owned by local
governments it is a problem that while the
nominal assets cannot be encumbered, the mar-
ketable real estates that can be offered as col-
lateral are rather encumbered in this segment.
The number of properties that can be pledged
is low, the establishment of their collateral
value requires appraisal, the cost of which is
borne by the client. The general trend is that
local governments are not willing to offer their
real estates, and banks do not encourage the
opposite either, as they consider the legal pro-
cedures that they may encounter upon acquir-
ing the real estates problematic. (Bank &
Tõzsde, 2007)
The Act on Local Governments regulates
local governments’ right to have property in
their ownership and the framework of financial
management of assets in detail. It is also stipu-
lated here that the objective of local government
nominal assets is to ensure the performance of
local government tasks. Consequently, these
asset elements cannot be sold and cannot be
encumbered. Local governments, creditor
banks, land title offices and auditors are all
responsible for observing and following the
Chart 4 
CHANGES IN REAL SECURITY COVERAGE OF COMMERCIAL BANKS' 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPOSURE 
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law. During its audits conducted in 2003–2006
in connection with asset management, the SAO
concluded that non-marketable properties
belonging to the nominal assets were sold and
the transactions were registered by land title
offices in the case of as many as 9 local govern-
ments, also violating the nullity provisions of
the Civil Code regarding the alienation of non-
marketable properties. (Kovács, 2008) All this
can be considered the joint moral hazard of all
the participants listed above.8
From local government and asset manage-
ment aspects, the question we have to ask is
what purpose the borrowed but not yet spent
funds will serve. As depicted in Chart 5 as well,
a significant portion of the funds borrowed
remains with the creditor as deposits, provid-
ing liquidity on the liability side. If these funds
are used with an aim to develop public proper-
ty, the question is whether the local govern-
ment will be able to operate the assets and to
preserve their condition and substance. This
question is especially relevant in the case of
monies that can be drawn from the European
Union on the basis of grant applications, for
which at present the interest-bearing “foreign
funds” on local governments’ deposit accounts
are still considered to be own resources.
Accordingly, the main question here is how the
local government system utilises the EU funds.
(See Chart 5.)
In connection with the analysis of risks, it is
worth calling attention to the fact that – from a
creditor’s aspect – financing with bonds issued
for a limited scope of buyers9 is riskier than lend-
ing. For more details on this subject see Gál
(2010a).
In the case of funds that can be obtained
through bond issuance and investment loans,
there is a significant difference in how they
encourage debtors to follow rational economic
behaviour. Loan agreements may contain other
conditions (covenants) and contractual clauses
with regard to the debtor, indicating expecta-
Chart 5
CHANGES IN THE LOAN/DEPOSIT POSITION OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECTOR
Source: own editing based on MNB data














tions and requirements in connection with the
debtor’s financial management. With the help
of the aforementioned clauses, a properly con-
cluded loan agreement that really serves an
accumulation purpose, and if the funds for
operation are also available, is able to cause
local governments to conduct rational financial
management and behave in a sensible manner.
It is able to tie the hands of the local govern-
ment over the longer term. Due to its positive
impact on the financial management of the
local government it moves the pointer of the
scales between borrowing and bond issuance in
the direction of borrowing. Nevertheless, most
of the raising of external funds is achieved
through bond issuance.
In September 2008, MNB conducted a ques-
tionnaire survey of banks that are active in the
local government sector, investigating the pur-
poses for which long-term debt (credit + bond)
is used in the budgets of local governments.
(Homolya – Szigel, 2008) Based on the data
supplied by the responding credit institutions,
the purpose of 10 per cent of the financing of
local governments through bond issuance is
operation, while 40 per cent of it is not tied to
any specific purpose. This roughly shows that
about half of the bond issues serves the funding
of operating costs from long-term liabilities,
which behaviour cannot be accepted on the
basis of any financing logic.
Possibilities and Dynamics of Changes
in Interest and Non-Interest Factors
The strong supply side concentration indicates
that a serious market competition for seizing
clients has evolved, often resulting in sluggish
prices and low interest margin in the local gov-
ernment lending market. (Bank & Tõzsde,
2007) However, the crisis experienced nowa-
days in financial markets and its turbulent
effects will presumably affect the interest rate
policy of the local government market as well.
(MNB, 2009b) In addition, banks’ lending
policies changed remarkably both in terms of
willingness to lend and other conditions.
(MNB, 2009a, b)
The lending survey compiled by MNB10 allows
the examination of price and non-price factors
and carrying out a broad comparison of the
local government and corporate clienteles.
However, the conclusions that can be drawn in
the course of the analysis carry major uncer-
tainties.11 Data on local governments are avail-
able in the lending survey starting from the
second half of 2007; therefore, the data series
between the second half of 2007 and the fourth
quarter of 2009 can be used for the comparison.
The examination of price and non-price fac-
tors can be separated in the course of the analy-
sis. The examination attempts to perceive the
differences in the corporate and local govern-
ment segments upon changing the price and
non-price factors. It also intends to establish in
which of the two groups of factors (price and
non-price factors) can a more dynamic move-
ment be discerned in the local government
lending market. Methodologically, the findings
of the lending survey always show net changes,
within which the net change is expressed in the
interrelationship of those who tighten (+) and
those who ease (–).
Looking at the extent and dynamics of the
changes that took place in price factors (see
Chart 6), several conclusions may be drawn. In
regard to the premium on riskier loans, the
local government portfolio fundamentally
points to tightening in the whole period under
review. Easing mainly took place in the case of
the spread and other charges. It is worthy of
note that in the fourth quarter of 2009 – when
easing in the various lending conditions may be
perceived for the first time after the effects of
the credit crisis – the movement of the risk pre-
mium in the local government portfolio is a
mere 27 per cent, while in the case of corporate STUDIES 
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loans, only in this quarter, the risk premium
showed a 44 per cent movement. Based on data
available from 2010, the figures point to easing
in terms of all the three elements under review
in the corporate portfolio, but this dynamics is
not followed by the local government portfo-
lio. Considering the whole period under review,
the volatility of the risk premium is higher and
more dynamic in the corporate portfolio than
in the local government portfolio.
The analysis of non-price factors suggests
that in the local government portfolio – taking
the period under review as a basis – the most
dynamic changes took place in the maximum
maturity, in coverage requirements, the
debtor’s contractual obligations and in the
required minimum level of creditworthiness.
Compared to the tightening measures of 2009,
considerable easing was experienced in terms of
the required minimum level of creditworthi-
ness in the first three quarters of 2010. This
also supports the assertion that commercial
banks deem lending to local governments safe.
It can be concluded on the basis of the
detailed analysis performed (Gál, 2010a) that –
taking account of the uncertainty factors as
well – both the interest and non-interest fac-
tors of the local government lending portfolio
follow the movements observed in the enter-
prising sector with more careful movements.
The changes perceived, in turn, cannot primari-
ly be observed in the factors that are related to
the interest premium.
The commercial banks that are active in lend-
ing to local governments expected to be granted
more scope for action in terms of changing the
interest rates as a result of the new capital regu-
lation to be introduced with the Basel II.
However, the rules of the standard capital
requirement calculation based on the rating of
the sovereign debtor did not allow a reduction
of interest rates. (Gál, 2010a) Holding out the
Chart 6
PRICE FACTORS
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prospect of continuous uncertainties and down-
gradings that can be perceived in the rating of
the sovereign debtor in our days as well induced
the maintenance of the capital requirement or
even its increasing sometimes.
DEMAND-SIDE FEATURES
Due to its fragmented nature, the system of
local governments in Hungary incurs a lot of
criticism, although in terms of its concentra-
tion it is not unique at all. Of the municipali-
ties, large villages and villages have the greatest
number; they amount to 89 per cent of the
whole sector. The number of local govern-
ments is 2 844 in this group. Towns with coun-
ty rank, counties, districts of the capital and
towns account for the remaining 11 per cent,
but the indebtedness of the sector is still attrib-
utable to this low number of participants. 
It is easy to prove this assertion if we exam-
ine the distribution of bond issues among local
governments, which resulted in the increase in
the sector’s indebtedness in the last 2 years (see
Chart 7). The increase in issuances and indebt-
edness is attributable to the towns, towns with
county rank and counties. These local govern-
ments account for approximately 88 per cent of
all bonds, while regarding the whole local gov-
ernment sector it only belongs to 347 local
governments. 
Accordingly, within the whole local govern-
ment sector – taking into account other loans
as well – the number of creditworthy local gov-
ernments can be around 350–400. These local
governments do not struggle with indebted-
ness problems, and there is a continuing fierce
market competition for winning these local
governments. In view of the embeddedness of
the sector in the general government, even these
few local governments are able to induce risks
Chart 7 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF BONDS AMONG LOCAL GOVERNMENT SEGMENTS 
(2005–2008)12
Source: own editing based on the data of the Hungarian State Treasury
Local governments  Local governments Local governments of the Local governments Villages 













from a macroeconomic aspect. (Homolya –
Szigel, 2008; Gál, 2010b)
Similarly to the supply side of the market,
concentration is observed on the demand side as
well. This is explained by the local government
sector, which is determined in terms of the
number of local governments, and by the
extremely diversified structure of local govern-
ments from the aspect of creditworthiness.
Financing Requirement or Fleeing
Forward
In terms of the financial management of local
governments it is extremely important that
local governments are unable to finance their
operating expenses only from their own rev-
enues.13 The creation of the money single fund
and the passage between budgets hamper the
realisation of a balanced budget and the com-
pliance with the “golden rule” of financing. In
addition to the excessive difficulties in per-
forming the tasks and the decline in the ratio
and real value of budgetary subsidies14, the
negative expectations of local governments15
also affect their ability and intention to raise
external funds.
Several research works (Research Institute of
the State Audit Office of Hungary, 2008; Bank
& Tõzsde, 2007; Gál, 2010a; Homolya – Szigel,
2008; Vigvári 2009) have dealt with the recent
indebtedness of local governments in Hungary
and with the relevant reasons and consequences.
This reflects the importance and weight of the
problem. The main reason why the analysis of
the subject was placed on the agenda is that
while loans in the years before 2007 had served
the financing of the budget deficit, there was a
drastic change in 2007. Since that year a trend
has been observed in the developments in the
indebtedness of local governments that is not
justified by the direction or magnitude of the
change in the GFS deficit. (See Chart 8)
Chart 8 
THE GFS BALANCE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND THE CHANGES IN TOTAL DEBT
(2002–2009)
Note: The GFS balance does not include privatisation revenues.
Source: own editing based on the data of the MNB and the Ministry of Finance













The overwhelming majority of the funds
flowing into the sector as a result of borrowing
and bond issues can be found on the liability
side of the balance sheet of credit institutions,
in the form of time deposit. These deposits,
which may amount to some 200 billion forints
(0.8 per cent of GDP), reduce the liquidity risk
for both participants. In this manner, local gov-
ernments can accumulate significant funds of
their own for the drawing of EU funds, and
their liquidity has also improved, while the
creditor’s liability side liquidity is improved by
the deposits. All this justifies a more thorough
examination of local governments’ deposits.
Local Governments’ Deposits
I think that one of the most interesting issues
in connection with the analysis of the financing
requirement of the local government sector is
the accumulation of deposits. One may ask if it
can be worth for any economic agent to keep
its loan extended at a high interest rate in a
deposit. Can this transaction result in an inter-
est margin for the client, and if so, what is its
magnitude? 
The analysis of this question may be facili-
tated by MNB’s aggregate statements regard-
ing local governments’ deposits and loans.
These statements are based on the analysis of
the interests specified and credited in connec-
tion with the outstanding loans and deposits of
monetary financial institutions. (See Chart 9)
The diagram summarises the credited and
debited interests on local governments’
deposits and loans in a monthly breakdown and
billions of forints. The chart attempts to find
an answer to whether – examining individual
months – there can be a situation when the
total interest credited for the deposits is higher
than the total amount that local governments
Chart 9 
THE TOTAL VALUE OF INTERESTS SPECIFIED AND CREDITED IN CONNECTION WITH LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS' DEPOSITS AND LOANS KEPT WITH MONETARY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS,
(HUF billion)
Source: own editing based on MNB data













have to pay after the loans. The chart is suitable
for drawing several conclusions:16
between 2005 and 2007, the interests spec-
ified for loans and the ones credited to
deposits moved in the same direction and
practically  simultaneously. The specified
amount of loan interests shows that the
interest on loans was all the time above the
deposit interests with an insignificant
spread. However, cyclical movements
(experienced monthly or every two
months) continuously allowed local gov-
ernments to perform short-term liquidity
management in the case of putting the
borrowed funds into time deposits;
between January 2007 and March 2008,
total specified loan interests were always
above the credited deposit interests. Thus
the spread that evolved was not suitable
for carrying out the liquidity management
observed in the earlier period. This is the
period when the most dynamic growth in
local governments’ indebtedness is also
observed;
in 2008, an increase took place in the total
amount of debited loan interests (presum-
ably together with the interest rate),
which was partly motivated by the afore-
mentioned Basel II regulation. This may
also justify the increase in March 2009,
when the local government regulatory
capital17 reacted to the changes in the rat-
ing of the sovereign debtor, together with
which the interest rate on loans also
increased;
starting from March 2008, based on the
movements of loan and deposit interests,
short-term liquidity management became
possible for local governments again;
from March 2009 until June 2010, with
minor interruptions, the total value of
interests credited on deposits continuous-
ly exceeded the total value of interests to
be paid after loans. This is partly attribut-
able to the fact that local governments’
bond issuance slowed down in 2009. This is
also a good reflection of banks’ liquidity
risk reducing strategy as well as of their
asset and liability side adjustment;
the increase in interest credited on loans
from June 2010 on indicates the increase in
the willingness to lend of the credit insti-
tutions that finance local governments.
Short-term liquidity management was an
applicable strategy for local governments
in the second half of 2010 as well.
The picture is nuanced by the fact that local
governments – in most cases – borrow in euros
or Swiss francs and deposit these funds in
forints. The exchange loss resulting from the
difference between the exchange rate prevailing
at the time of the borrowing or bond issuance
and at the date of repayment significantly
reduces the yields attained on the deposits.
Concrete calculations to point out these losses
cannot be found in the technical literature yet,
but – also taking account of the known
exchange rate fluctuations – a considerable
adverse effect on the outcome can be expected. 
It is important to mention that although
placing savings in deposits is at the lowest risk
level on the basis of the yield risk (with a lower
expected yield compared with other invest-
ment possibilities), one important aspect
should not be disregarded. For the sake of the
safety of deposits and depositors, the Act on
Credit Institutions and Financial Enterprises
regulates the system and institution of the
National Deposit Insurance in detail. However,
the National Deposit Insurance Fund of
Hungary (NDIF) excludes local governments
from the subjects of deposit insurance. This is a
factor that has to be taken into account among
the risks of the local government system in any
case.18 The question arises: What will happen
to the deposits of the local government if the
account-holding bank goes bankrupt? Will the
state become involved with its guarantee? STUDIES 
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A concrete example for this question is the
case of Jógazda Takarékszövetkezet. The activity
of this mutual savings bank was terminated on 
4 January 2011. At the same time this is the date
of launching the compensation procedure for the
depositors insured by the NDIF. In this concrete
case altogether 13 local governments lost their
deposits amounting to a total 59 million forints.
The biggest local government deposit that was
frozen amounted to 29 million forints.19 The
depositors that were excluded from the compen-
sation may exercise their right to enforce their
claims during the liquidation procedure.
Jógazda Takarékszövetkezet was not a mem-
ber of the Integration of Savings Co-operatives;
therefore, it is not a member of the capital and
deposit protection system of OTIVA (National
Fund for the Institutional Protection of Savings
Co-operatives) either. The system of OTIVA20
excludes the possibility of the suspension of the
activity of credit institutions because of capital
problems, and thus it excludes the freezing of
deposits as well. This fact is an important risk-
reducing element in the system.
The accumulated deposits result in tight
interdependence between the two market par-
ticipants. Local governments are present in the
market as important providers of liquidity,
which makes them a prominent market player
in times of scarce liquidity. The stability of
financial markets and the solvency of the cred-
it institution system constitute the only collat-
eral of local governments’ deposits. At the
same time, the deposits ensure a certain per-
centage of return on the loans and on the
bonds issued.
Softening the Rule Based Model and
the Budget Constraint
The upper limit of local governments’ indebt-
edness is regulated by Section 88 of the Act on
Local Governments, while the rules of opera-
tion of local governments that have become
unable to function are set out in the Act on the
Debt Settlement of Local Governments. These
legal regulations were adopted in order to keep
the indebtedness of local governments within
strict limits and to make the prevailing body of
representatives conduct responsible financial
management. These legal regulations represent
relevant rules not only for local governments,
but also for the credit institutions that are part-
ners in money and capital market relations as
well as for the partners that established a sup-
plier’s relationship with local governments. All
these regulations together aimed at creating a
hard budget constraint (Kornai et al., 2004a;
2004b).
The functioning and rules of the Act on the
Debt Settlement of Local Governments are
presented in detail by (Jókay – Osváth –
Sóvágó – Szmetana, 2004 and Jókay – Veres-
Bocskay, 2009).The legislator’s concrete objec-
tive with the adoption of the Act was to restore
the solvency of local governments by applying
this Act. Another objective was to create the
conditions necessary for performing the
mandatory tasks and to ensure the complete or
at least asset-proportionate satisfaction of
creditors’ claims. In addition, it also aimed at
motivating both local governments and their
partners to conduct a more prudent market
behaviour and to prevent indebtedness.
However, from the aspect of the analysis of the
local government lending market, some general
conclusions can be drawn from the procedures
conducted to date.
The Act works in a preventative manner. It
slowed down bad borrowings already by 2000,
as the procedure projects the possibility of
distribution of assets,21 which is always done
at the expense of the creditor. The bankrupt-
cy procedures launched after 2000 are mostly
explained by criminal cases. The researches
that examined the bankruptcies concluded
that the law is not observed, in spite of its pre- STUDIES 
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ventive nature. The low number of bankrupt-
cies is attributable to the fact that creditors
and suppliers enter into agreements or grant a
respite in the last minute. Following the clo-
sure of the debt settlement procedure the
local government can continue to develop and
borrow. However, the number of inhabitants
of the settlements where local governments
have gone bankrupt to date is below 3000.
Therefore, as a result of their financial charac-
teristics, their resource gap will remain for a
long time.
It is observed that – with the exception of
the experience of one case (Nemesgulács) –
suppliers and creditors do not initiate the
launching of a debt settlement procedure.
“Presumably, the underlying reason is that in
the beginning they trust that the central budg-
et will settle the debt instead of the given local
government...” (Jókay – Veres-Bocskay, 2009,
p. 115). Then, after learning about the content
of the law and realising that only a fraction of
their claim may be recovered, they wait to the
very last. 
It can also be established that local govern-
ments also request the launching of the proce-
dure against themselves in the very last
moment, because by the procedure they
exclude themselves from various opportunities
to receive funding. Very often, only the crisis
budget makes the local governments subjected
to the procedure realise that “bearing commu-
nity burdens does not mean that the local gov-
ernment performs, organises and also com-
pletely finances certain tasks. The purpose of
local taxes is to contribute to the costs of the
performance of tasks.” (Jókay – Veres-Bocskay,
2009, p. 117)
Most often the bankruptcies were the result
of illegal, unlawful operation. One of the gen-
eral features of the bankrupted local govern-
ments was that they struggled with organisa-
tional operational deficiencies. It was found in
several cases that internal audit and competent
economic experts were missing. Researches
came to the conclusion in the case of several
bankruptcies that the SAO had already exam-
ined the settlement concerned, and in its audit
it had pointed out the shortcomings that had
been expected to result in financial difficulties
later. Shortcomings in the information system
of the general government were also found.
The accounting on a cash basis allowed the
non-payment of certain invoices for more than
60, 120 days or even for several years. 
In view of the developments in the debts
accumulated in the local government sector, it
is becoming an interesting question whether in
the coming years we will witness transformations
and mergers that are already considered to be
accepted and regulated practice in the enter-
prising sector.
Overall, the law provides an adequate frame-
work for conducting the debt settlement pro-
cedure. However, non-compliance with the law
does not entail sanctions. The application of
the debt settlement procedure may primarily
be suitable for managing the problems related
to creditors. In approximately half of the pro-
cedures conducted to date, the enforceable dis-
traint or collection of debt based on suppliers’
overdue invoices convinced the given local gov-
ernment to initiate a debt settlement procedure
against itself. The procedure is only launched
when they cannot even finance the basic task.
To sum it up, the budget constraint of local
governments has steadily softened in recent
years. All market players have participated in
and caused this process. By creating subsidies
for local governments with financial problems
through no fault of their own and funds to be
disbursed by the minister that serve a similar
purpose, the central budget included an espe-
cially important funding element in the financ-
ing system. The continuous overfulfilment of
this appropriation also indicates that – contrary
to the original objective – local governments
already take into account these two funds when STUDIES 
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planning their respective budgets. Moreover,
the questionnaire survey conducted by the
Research Institute of the State Audit Office of
Hungary in the summer of 2008 points out that
due to the aforementioned reasons the subsi-
dies for local governments with financial prob-
lems through no fault of their own do not ade-
quately aim at the local authorities that are real-
ly in need. The subsidies for local governments
with financial problems through no fault of
their own and the “funds to be disbursed by the
minister” are considered as planned revenues
by many local governments already upon plan-
ning the budget. (Lóránt, 2009)
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In the Hungarian local government lending
market, the regulation of local governments’
indebtedness warrants the supplementing of
the models drawn up in the international liter-
ature. This assertion of mine is supported by
the interconnections explored and lessons
drawn during the detailed – demand and supply
based – analysis of the domestic market. It can
be stated that the regulation of the indebted-
ness of the Hungarian local government lend-
ing market can be described by the model of
“risk-taking based competition”.
Borrowing by and indebtedness of
Hungarian local governments are limited by
legal regulations, but there are no sanctions of
violating these regulations. Consequently,
there is no legal way to enforce their obser-
vance. Therefore, the regulation of indebted-
ness does not match the rule based model.
The essence of the market regulated model –
that for the players of the subnational level the
raising of external funds is determined by
money and capital market developments and
mechanisms – examining the domestic market
by itself, cannot be substantiated. The underly-
ing reason is that market participants trust the
implicit government guarantee; at the same
time, the decisions of the supply side actors are
determined by their ability and willingness to
take risks. The success of the market regulated
model is also hindered by the fact that market
participants are not perfectly informed. The
moral hazards explored during my empirical
researches, the deficiencies experienced in the
information and control system, the consider-
able lobbying force of the demand side and the
concentrated nature of the supply side all con-
firm the disfunctionality of the market regulat-
ed model.
The features of the model of “risk-taking based
competition” are summarised below:
Xboth sides of the market are strongly con-
centrated;
Ylooking at the demand side stakeholders,
the number of local governments that are con-
sidered to be large borrowers is low;
Zthe information available for supply side
stakeholders and their decisions are distorted
by ex ante information asymmetries;
[the features of money and capital market
instruments are affected by moral hazard;
\the regulation of indebtedness is solved by
legal regulations, but compliance with the rules
cannot be enforced;
]the behaviour of market players is not
rational;
^the budget constraint of market players is
soft;
_the liquidity of instruments issued by
demand side stakeholders to financial markets
is limited. There is no secondary market of the
bonds issued;
`lending decisions are motivated by com-
mercial banks’ willingness to take risks. STUDIES 
144
1 I would like to thank András Vígvári for the birth of
this study and for supporting its publication.
2 These are summarised by Kapás (2003). 
3 In the US system, which is close to that of the free
market, local government bond yields enjoy
favourable interest, but in the case of financial diffi-
culties the bankruptcy regulations that apply to busi-
ness organisations prevail. For more details see
Kopányi – Vigvári, (2003a)
4 The public procurement obligation in using financial
services is bound to a value limit of eight million
forints. Below this threshold, transactions can be
effected without applying a public procurement pro-
cedure; smaller local governments belong to this
value limit.
5 The work by Kovács, G. (2009) discusses the ques-
tions of economies of scale of local government
bonds in detail.
6 Considering that most of the issuances were denom-
inated in foreign currency, the value is affected by the
exchange rate fluctuations.
7 The banks interviewed by MNB cover nearly 94 per
cent of the portfolio of banks that are active in the
total lending to local governments.
8 In the case of creditor banks, capital requirement
reduction, with the so-called Credit Risk Mitigation
(CRM) techniques, may primarily be in the back-
ground. Hypothecary securities also belong to here.
9 The study uses the concept of bonds where return is
provided from the proceeds and which does not con-
tain any other options.
10 The lending survey is prepared by the Financial
Stability organisational unit of MNB. In the initial
period of the surveys, from 2003 until January
2009, the analyses were prepared biannually,
before switching to quarterly frequency in January
2009. The lending survey, which is carried out in
the housing, consumption, corporate, business
and local government segments as well, examines
the supply behaviour of banks. In all cases, the
survey indicates movements on a relative scale.
The survey focuses on whether there has been any
change in the quarter under review compared to
the previous quarter, and also looks ahead. The
survey examines qualitative information that is
rapidly available, but difficult to quantify. The
types of questions examined include the amount
of loan intended to be lent (willingness to lend),
lending standards and conditions, the develop-
ments in the demand for loans as well as the
changes in portfolio quality. 15 banks and 6 leasing
firms have been involved in the survey. They rep-
resent a 90–97 per cent coverage of the total sup-
ply sector, depending on the segment examined.
11 a) Stemming from the nature of the questioning
one cannot be sure to what extent the answers
reflect the facts.
b) The corporate portfolio is rather complex. I
highlighted the data of the segment of non-finan-
cial corporations during the analysis. The analysis
does not cover the small and micro enterprises.
(As the greatest debtors of the local government
sector are also the larger local governments, for
the comparison I focused on the large companies
on the corporate side as well. Since 2009, MNB’s
lending surveys have presented the data on large
companies and non-financial corporations in an
aggregate manner.)
12 The data were published by Lóránt (2009).
13 This is what local governments’ financial architec-
ture decsribes. (Gyõrffi – Vigvári – Zsugyel, 2009)
14 In addition to the decline in the real value of subsi-
dies, their becoming increasingly fragmented is also
part of this problem. The frequent changes in the
rules of sharing own-right and assigned revenues
(e.g. change in the rules of sharing the personal
income tax), which practically make the planning of
the budgets of local governments impossible and
make the provision of public services at an
unchanged level uncertain, also belong here.
15 The Ministry of Finance prepared a proposal for the
amendment of the law regarding local governments
in November 2007. It would change the prevailing
borrowing limit, but it would have required a two
thirds majority of the National Assembly.
16 Naturally, the conclusions are to be understood at
the level of all local governments together. The
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behaviour of individual local governments may be
different from it.
17 It was discussed in detail on the supply side.
18 Not only the National Deposit Insurance Fund, but
the Investor Protection Fund also excludes local
governments from its subjects.
19 For further details see the NDIF website.
20 For details see the OTIVA website.
21 Analysing the already closed cases, creditors have
been able to collect only a low portion of the prin-
cipal and nothing of the interest at all. It is typical of
the distribution of assets that the creditor receives
zero per cent of the arrears of interest and 1–10 per
cent of the principal sum in cash.
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